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The explosive growth of online social networking sites has been one of the dominant stories of the 
Internet era.  Since their introduction in 1997, social networking sites are now common, with global 
leader Facebook boasting more than 1 billion users.1  And the field is not restricted to tech-savvy citizens 
of the U.S. and Europe.  Chinese social media giant Renren reported 178 million total users in its filing 
for an initial public offering, with 58 million logging on monthly.2  Russia’s Odnoklassniki boasts more 
than 40 million users, including almost 14% of the population of post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan.3  And while 
closed societies such as North Korea block public access to the Internet, social media sites have proven 
popular enough that the regime hosts several on its internal intranet.4  
Beyond the size of the social media audience, the technology has generated interest because of its 
ability to organize large groups of people to solve tasks or provide information.  The most prominent 
examples of this have been in disaster relief operations such as the response to the 2010 Haitian 
earthquake.  In that instance, a global group of volunteers monitored social media such as Facebook or 
Twitter to plot reports about trapped persons, medical emergencies, and needs for supplies on a 
common situation map.  Response crews were then able to use this real time information to prioritize 
resources and rescue efforts.5   
 
Social media enabled crowds have also proven adept at locating and reporting on less obvious 
information.  A team of MIT students and staff won the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) “Red Balloon Challenge” in 2009 by finding 10 tethered weather balloons scattered across the 
United States and reporting the locations back to DARPA in under 9 hours.6  Not to be outdone, the 
State Department followed up with the “Tag Challenge” in 2012, which required teams to locate five 
people in locations on two continents using only a single photograph of the “suspect” as a starting point.  
The winning team made up of computer scientists from five universities located three of the five 
suspects in less than 12 hours.7   
 
Successes such as these, together with the continuous stream of innovation taking place in the social 
media arena, have led to calls to apply this technology to the nonproliferation field.  Under Secretary of 
State for Arms Control and International Security Rose Gottemoeller summarized the sentiment in a 
2012 speech at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO):  “Today, any event, 
anywhere on the planet, could be broadcast globally in seconds.  That means it is harder to hide things. 
When it is harder to hide things, it is easier to be caught.”8  This has certainly proven to be the case in 
Syria, where the first evidence of the use of chemical weapons was not delivered via a diplomatic 
demarche at the UN but through the posting of a victims’ video to the video sharing site YouTube.com.9  
   
Taken together, examples such as the ones above and others have breathed new life into the concept of 
societal verification or “inspection by the people.”  The concept of involving the general public in 
monitoring and verifying arms control agreements was first proposed in the late 1950s by Seymour 
Melman10  and Lewis Bohn11 as a means of verification of agreements when on-site inspections were not 
practical.  Later thinkers attempted to include a basic form of whistleblowing protection for “citizen 
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inspectors” in international law,12 and physicist and peace activist Joseph Rotblat famously proposed to 
add such protections to every country’s domestic law in order to establish societal verification as an 
integral part of a global treaty to ban nuclear weapons.13 
 
While intriguing in theory, societal verification has so far proved unworkable in practice.  Not 
surprisingly, states have been reluctant to grant blanket whistleblowing protection to citizens who may 
be reporting on issues of state security.  Citizens too have proven reluctant to blow the whistle, either 
out of patriotism and loyalty, or out of fear of reprisal.  The obvious question is whether today’s new 
social media technologies can somehow be harnessed to overcome these old obstacles. 
 
At first glance, the challenges seem large.  Skeptics are quick to point out another problem with using 
social media for societal verification:  open information can just as easily be used by terrorists and other 
bad actors as it can by nonproliferation advocates.  Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that 
disinformation and active attempts to defeat the goals of cooperation are in fact the norm in most 
online crowdsourcing activities.14  Beyond subverting an information gathering campaign, what is to stop 
a terrorist or criminal from using the information provided to target those reported materials?   
 
Even in instances where terrorism is unlikely, skeptics are also right to remind us that unskilled and 
amateur observers are unlikely to know what to look for or how to accurately report it.  This can quickly 
lead to a situation where responsible agencies or authorities are overloaded with false or misleading 
information.  Moreover, even when the information is correct, observers may not have the technical 
ability to transmit the data, it may be in a format that is incompatible with existing databases, or it may 
get lost or garbled in transmission.  It seems then that any social media solution risks adding machine 
reliability to an already problematic situation with eyewitness reliability.15   
 
The recent disclosure of large-scale online surveillance by the National Security Agency16 adds legal 
uncertainty to the list of technical and behavioral obstacles.  While corporations have published 
elaborate privacy statements that detail their use of user provided information, the legal procedures for 
governments to access and use these same data are unclear or significantly restricted.17  Beyond these 
domestic legal restrictions, it is equally unclear how citizen-derived nonproliferation verification 
information could be incorporated into existing treaty agreements or compliance mechanisms. 
 
This paper begins with a few definitions that will help to clarify the later discussion on capabilities of 
these technologies.  “Social media,” for example is frequently used as a type of shorthand to refer to a 
broad array of Internet-enabled technologies.  Rather than adopt this blanket term, the paper offers a 
typology of capabilities and attempts to place social media within a broader “new media” context.    
Once the definitions and typology have been explored, we provide a summary of some of the research 
that has been conducted into the field, starting with its basis in social theory and mathematics, and 
progressing to recent breakthroughs in computer modeling and large scale online experimentation.  This 
section will also highlight some of the empirical evidence documenting the capabilities and limitations of 
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the technologies as well as provide an overview of concepts such as “crowdsourcing,” “virality,” and 
“diffusion.” 
Following our review of the research literature, we present a comprehensive case study which we 
believe demonstrates some of the potential of new media technologies to support nonproliferation and 
arms control goals.  Examples are drawn from the fields of commercial satellite imagery analysis, text 
and data mining of public information, and the gaming and simulation community.  With the examples 
and lessons in hand, we will present a short list of general guidelines for the use of these technologies in 
a nonproliferation context.  Finally, we conclude with some recommendations for policymakers to 
consider with respect to the use of new media tools.   
Literature Review 
What is New Media and How Does it Differ from Social Media? 
Although network-enabled communication was invented in 196518 and the World Wide Web in 1990,19 
both scholars and the general public still disagree on how to name and describe the communication 
activity that takes place online.  Popular contenders have been “Web 2.0” and “the social web,” while 
communications scholars have tended to prefer the term “new media.”  Adding to the confusion is the 
increasingly common use of the term “social media” to refer to almost any online activity where users 
can interact with other users.  In order to avoid further confusion, this paper will use the term “new 
media” as the starting point for a functional description of the current online capabilities. 
According to the New Media Institute, new media is a “21st Century catchall term used to define all that 
is related to the Internet and the interplay between technology, images and sound.”20  Prominent 
communications scholar Paul Levinson offers a more refined description.  For Levinson the broad 
category of new media shares five essential characteristics:  1) Every Consumer is a Producer; 2) The 
media are free to the consumer and sometimes to the producer; 3) the media products both compete 
and act as catalysts for each other; 4) they are more than simply e-mail and online searches; and 5) the 
underlying software platforms are beyond the control of the individual users.21  New media can 
therefore be understood as the top level or broadest categorical term to describe interactive online 
activities. 
In their review of new media capabilities,22 Lee and Zolotova argue that the typical platform or software-
specific approach to describing new media is inadequate.  Software platforms often disappear or mimic 
each other, and it is also common to find platforms that offer multiple capabilities and are difficult to 
categorize.  For this reason, they propose using a functional approach to construct a typology of new 







It is important to reiterate the point that many common software platforms offer functionality that 
spans multiple categories.  For example, the micro-blogging platform Twitter would seem to fit squarely 
within the content creation category.  Yet the company’s own information page says “Twitter is the best 
way to connect with people, express yourself and discover what's happening,” seemingly emphasizing 
the social aspects of the service.23  And researchers have weighed in with the claim that Twitter is best 
understood as a broadcast medium.24  The implication is any attempt to apply new media technologies 
must adopt a multifaceted approach and should not be restricted to a single platform or function. 
The Science and History of New Media    
At its most basic level, new media is a form of communication between people.  The underlying 
structure of this communication began to intrigue researchers in the relatively new field of sociology in 
the 1920s and 1930s, culminating in Talcott Parson’s 1937 landmark The Structure of Social Action. 
Parson’s focus on society’s institutions led to further research into relations between these institutions, 
eventually leading back to the interplay between individuals and these institutions.  S.F. Nadel’s 1957 
Theory of Social Structure examined how individual roles relate to the surrounding environment, and his 
descriptions of these interactions strongly influenced the later development of network approach to 
social theory. 
Examples:
problem distribution through crowdsourcing
*medical research 
*GitHub




Typology: Broad New Media Capabilities




























*location-based games (e.g.Four Square)









Geographic Information System (GIS) 
challenge 
& solution
***These new media categories represent loosely defined fungible functions that new media can perform. Based on design solutions, 
resources, and other considerations, any given challenge can be potentially addressed using various combinations of these new media 
tools. Moreover, many new media platforms/tools can be utilized for more than one of these functions. For instance, Facebook, a social 




Although “social network analysis” has gained great currency with the rise of social networking sites 
such as Facebook, John Barnes first used the term in 1954 to describe the interactions among people 
and groups in a Norwegian fishing village.25  The utility of the term and his analytical approach was 
quickly realized, and by the early 1970s, social networks were a popular topic of research in fields as 
diverse as economics, sociology, political science, and psychology.26 Oddly enough, the theoretical basis 
of much of the understanding of 21st century new media traces itself to the research conducted at that 
time. 
Perhaps the most recognizable of this early research was Stanley Milgram’s 1967 examination of the 
“small world problem,” named after the phenomenon of two people discovering a mutual and 
unexpected acquaintance and exclaiming “it’s a small world.”27  Milgram was primarily motivated by the 
question of social distance and was curious about how information could travel between different social 
groups or classes.  Some argued that social groups were essentially closed circles while others felt that 
some degree of overlap was inevitable.  Recent mathematical research had been published that 
calculated most people had a circle of acquaintances made up of approximately 500 people, and that 
the odds were therefore better than 50-50 that any two people in that group knew each other.  Milgram 
decided to conduct a live experiment to see if this was true. 
He began by asking a simple question:  is it possible for a random person in the Midwest to contact a 
select person in Boston using only his chain of acquaintances?  To test the theory, Milgram identified a 
wheat farmer in Kansas and sent him instructions to transmit a document to a test target—the wife of a 
Divinity student in Cambridge by selecting one person he knew personally and passing the document 
along.  Astonishingly, the document only passed through two intermediaries and arrived at the target in 
just four days.28  Milgram continued the experiment, finally calculating the median number of steps to 
be five, leading to the famous “six degrees of separation” concept so familiar today. 
Later researchers found some methodological problems with Milgram’s experiment,29 but the key 
findings have held up well.  Fundamentally, the experiment demonstrated that it is possible for 
information to traverse a large network, even if the entire network is not visible from any individual 
point.   Curiously, the experiment also showed that one of his selected targets received more than 50% 
of his documents from just three people, providing the first empirical evidence of the strong clustering 
tendency later shown to be a basic feature present in all naturally evolving networks. 
While Milgram was interested in the communication between social groups, Everett Rogers was 
fascinated by how and why companies adopt new technologies.  As he studied the problem, he realized 
one important element was how information moves through a social network.  In a departure from 
most theoretical work, Rogers based his ideas on case studies and empirical evidence drawn from actual 
experiences in the corporate world.  His efforts resulted in a sophisticated model of communication he 
termed the “Diffusion of Innovations” In 1962.30  Rogers found four common elements in the spread of 
new ideas:  an innovation communicated through distinct channels over a period of time among 
members of a social system.   
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Rogers’ findings create something of a paradox.  The social system for the innovations he was studying 
was large firms in the 1950s and 1960s.  These systems were mostly hierarchical, and therefore relied on 
group leaders to approve or reject new ideas.  These leaders were not acting on their own, however.  
Rogers found instead that the leader’s role was usually as an enforcer of the group norm.  The concept 
of “homophily,” the tendency of like-minded people to associate with each other, predicts exactly this 
type of behavior. The problem is this obviously leads to a situation where group-think must dominate, 
and information will tend to circulate within the group rather than diffuse through the organization. To 
account for the fact that information did indeed diffuse through some of these organizations, Rogers 
concluded some degree of “heterophily” or diversity within the groups must be present. 
The most influential attempt to explain this balance mechanism was made by Mark Granovetter in his 
1973 paper “The Strength of Weak Ties.”31  In it, Granovetter elaborates on a basic assumption of social 
interaction called balance theory.  Granovetter stumbled across the idea during his PhD research on how 
job seekers find jobs through their personal networks.  When surveyed, most successful job applicants 
responded that they found their positions through casual acquaintances, and not through the expected 
close friends or family.  Balance theory offered an explanation.  Briefly, it says that if Tom is a friend of 
Dick and a friend of Harry, Dick and Harry are likely to be friends as well.  That is because homophily 
leads to a friend of yours being a friend of mine. 
Granovetter’s contribution was to apply this logic to the bridge metaphor common to network analysis.  
He starts by offering a strong form of the balance hypothesis:  if Tom is strongly connected to Dick (e.g. 
close friend) and strongly connected to Harry, Dick and Harry must be connected as well.  This means it 
is impossible for there to be only one path between two of the three points.  Traditional network 
analysis says a bridge is the only path between two points.  If balance theory says that one can never 
have only one path when strong ties are present, it follows that only weak ties can function as bridges.   
Suddenly, the diffusion of information through networks makes sense.  It is not the strong ties that are 
critical for spreading new information, but the much more numerous weak ties.  Consider a funny 
anecdote.  If one friend tells another, it will probably circulate among their friendship circle until 
everyone has heard it, then die as the novelty wears off.  If, however, one member of the group passes 
it on to an acquaintance outside the group, it can spread anew.  Weak ties therefore function as bridges 
and offer access to novel information.  Networks composed of multiple weak ties should be excellent at 
spreading and reacting to new information.  And this is the basic principle underlying the “viral” 
phenomenon so prevalent online today.    
Although descriptive theories such as Granovetter’s seemed intuitively correct, and offered some 
empirical evidence to back them up, it was very difficult to model what exactly was going on.  The 
mathematics of graph (network) theory had been laid in the 18th century by Leonhard Euler with his 
solution of the “Seven bridges of Königsberg” problem which developed the concept of network nodes 
and links.  It was not until 1960, however, that Paul Erdős and his colleague Alfred Rényi were able to 
build a mathematical model of a random network structure.32 Armed with this information, the two 
were also to show how such a network would grow over time. 
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Remarkably, their model showed that a network would first develop a series of disconnected islands as 
nodes randomly sent out links to other nodes.  This continued for a period of time until a certain 
threshold of links was established, then the network suddenly underwent a “phase transition.”  After 
the transition, a “giant component” emerges and the entire network becomes connected.  This was the 
mathematical proof for the phenomenon Granovetter later observed.  Networks are highly efficient 
transmitters of information, and the larger a network is, the fewer links are required (proportionately) 
to connect all of the nodes to each other.   
As helpful as the Erdős-Rényi model was in proving the efficiency of networks, it still could not explain 
Milgram’s finding that points of an apparently random network somehow seemed to be connected by 
just a small number of hops.  The problem had to wait almost 40 years before computers became 
advanced enough to model the behavior of real social networks.  A major breakthrough occurred in 
1998 when Cornell mathematician Steven Strogatz and his graduate student Duncan Watts created a 
random network model that explained Milgram’s “small world” phenomenon as a simple compromise 
between the basic forces of order and disorder.33  What their model proved was that most networks, 
whether “biological, social, or man-made” would exhibit “small world” properties.  
The Watts and Strogatz model demonstrated “small world” networks would be everywhere, but it still 
showed little resemblance to the real world.  Most networks, for example, have a marked tendency to 
develop cliques, or clumps of tightly knit points.  Hub behavior is also common, with a single superstar 
receiving the lion’s share of incoming connections.  Last, there was no explanation of how networks 
achieve exponential growth.  How is it possible for the World Wide Web to consist of billions of 
connected pages when each page must be constructed and connected individually?   
It was left to the physicist Albert-László Barabási to provide the last piece of the puzzle.  By 
implementing a subtle shift in the rules of network growth, Barabási and his colleague Réka Albert 
created a model network that closely resembled those in the real world.34  By assuming that new nodes 
in a network had a slight preference for connecting to existing nodes, the network would grow rapidly 
and clusters around the earlier nodes would start to develop.  This “rich-get-richer” effect is described 
mathematically by a power law distribution.  In their paper, Barabási and Albert call the networks that 
exhibit this tendency “scale free,” and proved that an extraordinarily complex network like the Internet 
could arise from very simple starting conditions. 
Armed with the basic understanding of networks provided by these theoretical and mathematical 
models, researchers today have turned their attention to studying online social networks and other new 
media phenomenon in a quest to better understand the dynamics of these complex systems.  Their 
studies have highlighted a number of capabilities and limitations of these new technologies. 
One of the most popular subjects of new media research is the question of privacy and anonymity.  
Indeed, this is one of the fundamental questions in discussions of the applicability of new media to 
nonproliferation and arms control issues.  Can a citizen in a country such as North Korea or Iran safely 
communicate a nonproliferation violation without the risk of identification by the regime?  Sadly, the 
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research consensus is this is likely impossible. In fact, networked online systems appear particularly 
vulnerable to exploitation by determined individuals or states. 
Researchers have demonstrated that it is relatively simple to use supposedly anonymous or anonymized 
information to identify specific individuals.  In one case, scientists at MIT and Harvard determined the 
individual identities of cell phone users simply from the mobility data provided automatically when their 
phones switched between antennas.  Four switches were enough to uniquely identify 95% of the cell 
phone users in their database.35   
The ability to identify individuals is even greater when multiple information sources are subjected to 
machine learning techniques.  One study found one third of users who could be verified to have 
accounts both on Twitter, the well-known microblogging service, and Flickr, a photo-sharing web site 
could easily be re-identified on the anonymous data stream Twitter provides to advertisers.36  Stanford 
graduate students Jonathan Mayer and Patrick Mulcher concluded identifying individuals using basic 
metadata (e.g. cellular telephone logs containing only origin and destination telephone numbers) was 
“trivial.”  They used a combination of computer aided and human searching techniques and publicly 
available information to uniquely identify 91% of the owners of cellular telephone numbers in under an 
hour.37   
 
Access to new media is an additional concern with respect to its applicability to arms control and 
nonproliferation.  Social media companies routinely grab headlines with announcements of the size of 
their memberships,38 but these numbers mask important gaps in participation.  Chinese social media 
giant Sina Weibo, for example, reports more than 400 million active users.  Further analysis reveals, 
however, that the vast majority of these users are middle class and located in China’s wealthier coastal 
regions.39  Even more telling, the UN’s International Telecommunication Union reports only 42% of 
Chinese use the Internet.  The numbers are even lower in countries of proliferation concern such as Iran 
(26%), Pakistan (10%), and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (0%).40  Worse still, these 
numbers take into account both wired and mobile access, meaning any societal verification effort 
predicated on a “smart phone” revolution is likely to remain far in the future.    
 
One problem associated with access that is likely to remain unsolved is the issue of bad actors.  The 
paradox of new media is its primary strength—open access— is also a fundamental weakness.  Stories of 
stalking behavior and online bullying are commonplace in today’s connected world, as are criminal 
activities such as identity theft and large scale fraud.41  This vulnerability is a special concern whenever 
self-reported information becomes a key factor in decision making.  In the 2010 Haitian earthquake 
relief operation, for example, aid workers delayed operations to some areas based on unsubstantiated 
reports of violence,42 and misleading rumors about relief efforts on Twitter led to public relations 
problems for both UPS and American Airlines.43  
 
A more serious issue for societal verification than intentionally false reports is the use of new media for 
intimidation or retribution. Doctors without Borders reports its relief efforts in Burma have been 
hampered by online threats and hostility aimed at local workers.44  Narcotics cartels in Mexico have 
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conducted a more focused campaign.  Rival gangs post YouTube videos with decapitations and other 
gruesome crimes followed by threats to their enemies.45  The threats and reprisals are not limited to 
fellow gang members.  One cartel recently posted a video and circulated fliers offering a bounty of 
600,000 pesos (approximately $46,000) for the true identity of Valor por Tamaulipas, an active 
Facebook and Twitter user who posts information related to drug crimes and corruption in the Mexican 
state of Tamaulipas.46  
 
Information Diffusion, Crowdsourcing, and Data Mining 
Moving away from common limitations, new media also offers important new capabilities for 
nonproliferation efforts.  Rapid information diffusion is perhaps the most familiar example.  The 
December 2013 theft of a Cobalt-60 source in Mexico was publicized on social media and authorities 
detailed the theft and shared important safety information about radioactive contamination.  Later, 
when six men reported to a hospital for treatment for radiation exposure, word of their admission was 
first announced on Twitter.47  In less than five days, authorities had announced the theft, recovered the 
materials, and arrested the leading suspects. 
Academics have focused on the use of Twitter in information diffusion because of the ease of access to 
its information.  The research results provide good evidence to back up results like those seen in Mexico.  
In one experiment, a sample of 106 million tweets was used to demonstrate that any information “re-
tweeted” or shared by one user with another will reach a minimum of 1000 additional users. Moreover, 
this information is shared almost instantly, with one-half being shared within an hour and 75% within 
one day.48  
Despite many descriptive studies of information flow across social media networks, how it happens 
remains poorly understood.  Most people today are familiar with the concept of “virality,” where a 
particular news story or, more commonly, video clip is shared with millions of people.  Yet, attempts to 
induce this viral effect have been uniformly unsuccessful.  The reason is the inherent randomness of 
complex systems.  Duncan Watts likens virality to a forest fire.  Millions of lightning strikes hit forests 
every year, but only a tiny fraction become forest fires.  To do so, there must be some ideal combination 
of tinder, dryness, proximity of other trees, wind conditions, and so on.49 
Researchers have been more successful understanding how individuals influence each other online.  
Returning to the world of Twitter, studies have shown that influential users usually gain their influence 
over a period of time and through a concerted effort, often by focusing on a limited number of topics.50  
And while most studies measure influence through online metrics such as “re-tweets” on Twitter or 
“Likes” on Facebook, there is some evidence that online influence can be translated into real-world 
action.  In one of the most well-known studies, UC San Diego researchers teamed with Facebook data 
scientists to examine voting patterns.51  What they found was a tiny but significant influence effect 
among connected people on Facebook.  Although the effect was very small, when it was multiplied 
across the 61 million people in the study they estimate Facebook sharing was responsible for bringing an 
additional 340,000 people to the polls in the 2010 U.S. Congressional elections. 
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After information diffusion, crowdsourcing is probably the most well-known new media capability 
applicable to nonproliferation concerns.  The term was popularized by Wired magazine editor Jeff Howe 
in 2006,52 and today scholars generally accept the term to mean “online, distributed problem solving.”53   
 
The problem-solving aspect generally divides into two parts.  On the one hand, crowds are very good at 
solving discrete problems such as estimating the location of lost hikers54 or the number of beans in a 
jar.55  In fact, once a crowd approaches 1000 people, it will likely outperform an expert assessment 90% 
of the time.56  More common, however, is the use of crowds in goal-seeking processes.  Wikipedia is one 
example of this type of crowdsourcing, as is the Linux open-source computer operating system, and the 
T-shirt design firm Threadless. 
 
The goal-seeking aspect of crowdsourcing is well-suited for complex problem solving, and the 2009 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) “Red Balloon Challenge” has already 
demonstrated the applicability to nonproliferation and terrorism concerns.57  In that contest, an team 
led by students and researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology  (MIT) managed to locate 
10 weather balloons tethered at undisclosed locations across the continental United States in less than 
nine hours.  The State Department conducted a similar experiment called the “Tag Challenge” in 2012, 
but this time the task required locating and photographing five “thieves” located in five different cities 
in the U.S. and Europe.  MIT again had the winning team, identifying three of the five individuals within 
17 hours.58   
 
As the MIT examples suggest, for goal-seeking and complex problem solving, expert crowds are the 
most successful.59  A study of the performance of groups of scientists who teamed to address the most 
difficult technical problems posted by crowd-based research firm InnoCentive showed that one-third 
were solved.  This is in comparison to the 0% success rate achieved through traditional research and 
development channels.60  
 
Incentives, process, and structure all play important roles in successful crowdsourcing.  Surprisingly, 
monetary incentives are only one factor that encourages participation.61 Reputation and “bragging 
rights” also seem to be important, and the introduction of a simple reward system like a “most popular” 
or “top 10” list can also influence participation and successful outcomes.62  With respect to process, four 
elements are common to successful crowdsourcing efforts: pre-selection of the crowd; visibility and 
accessibility of peer contributions; aggregation of the efforts; and some form of remuneration.63  
Additional studies show active management of the effort is an important factor, and outcomes can be 
enhanced by thinking through the basic questions of what the specific goal is, who will conduct the task, 
how it will be structured, and why people would want to participate.64 
 
Data mining, or more formally, Knowledge Discovery in Databases (KDD),65 is the final new media 
capability that will be highlighted.  There have been numerous attempts to estimate how much 
information is openly available on the World Wide Web, but a recent and ultra-conservative estimate is 
1.6 billion unique web pages.66  Additionally, a 2001 estimate found at least 400-550 times that amount 
of information hidden in the “deep web,” in places such as password protected databases or 
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subscription-access publications.67  Data mining is a set of computer assisted tools and techniques that 
can help to discover useful information buried within this mass of data. 
 
Many of the most successful application of data mining techniques rely on so-called “supervised 
learning” methods, where the results obtained by a computer algorithm are revised and refined by a 
human domain expert.68  In general, data mining relies on statistical tools to either find similarities in 
data or predict outcomes or variables from data.  It has been used successfully in numerous fields 
ranging from insurance fraud detection69 to aviation safety analysis70 to prediction of novel biological 
warfare agents.71  
 
Much of the work in data mining has been with structured data, such as individual fields in a database or 
spreadsheet.  Deriving useful information from unstructured data such as text is an active field of 
research which has received increasing attention in the wake of social media’s publicized role in the 
Arab Spring.72  Research has focused on content analysis and topic identification,73 information 
extraction,74 and sentiment analysis.75  Combining various approaches, scholars have claimed some 
success in identifying and predicting future events, including stock market returns,76 movie box office 
revenues,77 and political protests in Latin America.78 
 
In addition to textual data, multimedia information retrieval and analytics79 is also an active field of data 
mining research.  Since much of the content online consists of images, video, and audio files, a variety of 
machine-assisted techniques have been developed to aid in information discovery.  However, despite 
some advances in the field of facial recognition,80 the field remains very much in its infancy.81 
 
Acknowledging the full span of new media capabilities and limitations, the following case study attempts 
to demonstrate the current state of possibilities with respect to nonproliferation problems.   
Case Study:  Applying New Media Tools 
On April 15, 2012, North Korea paraded what appeared to be six road-mobile intercontinental ballistic 
missiles, quickly identified in the media as KN-08 ICBMs, through Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang.82 
Attention immediately focused on these unusual vehicles, after Chinese bloggers identified them as 
Chinese-manufactured transporter-erector-launchers used by China’s strategic missile forces.83 
Chinese officials would later state that the Chinese firm in question had only exported the vehicles’ 
chassis, which can be used for a variety of civil purposes, including logging and construction. Although 
even the chassis export appeared to violate sanctions on North Korea, the Chinese showed evidence 
that the North Koreans had provided a false end-user for the vehicles and claimed they had added the 
erectors and other specialized equipment to the chassis themselves.84 
Using the full array of new media approaches described in this report, it is possible to make some 
preliminary judgments about China’s claim, as well as North Korea’s infrastructure for producing 
transporter-erector-launchers. Although it is hard to believe that the Chinese were not aware that North 
Korea would use the vehicle chassis for its illicit missile program, the available evidence does suggest 
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that North Korea added the erectors itself at existing facilities known to assemble North Korean 
transporter-erector launchers. What follows is an integrated case study on using new media to resolve a 
difficult question in the field of arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation. 
The WSV Sale 
Following the April 2012 parade, Chinese officials told the United Nations Panel of Experts that a 
Chinese firm, the Wanshan Special Vehicle Company (WSV), had exported six heavy-duty vehicle chassis 
to North Korea in 2011.85 The delivery appears to have been made in two shipments: two chassis in May 
2011, followed by another four chassis in October 2011.86 
In retrospect, information concerning the shipments was available in the public domain. The State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC or 国资委) 
announced the export of heavy-duty vehicle chassis to an unnamed foreign customer, as did WSV.87 
The two statements mentioned neither the number of chassis nor the identity of the customer, but did 
indicate that the customer – China’s first foreign customer for such vehicles – paid 12 million RMB in 
advance on a 30 million RMB order.88 
Chinese officials subsequently claimed that the North Koreans had claimed the vehicles were to be used 
in logging by North Korea’s Ministry of Forestry. Although the story is difficult to believe, logging and 
construction are plausible civil uses for the otherwise highly specialized vehicles. 
Figure 2 April 15, 2012 Parade Image and Marketing Photo of the Chinese WS51200 
 
A marketing photograph online depicted a chassis of this type with only a cab attached. One previously 
unresolved question is whether the Chinese exported fully assembled launchers, or just the chassis-and-
cab assembly, leaving North Korea to mount the launcher and other specialized equipment. 
Kim Jong Il’s Efforts to Defend the Country 
In 2013, North Korea released a commemorative video entitled Kim Jong Il’s Efforts to Defend the 
Country. This video is available on YouTube, where pro-North Korean groups post the country’s 
propaganda. Although it is strange to think of North Korea using social media extensively, the country’s 
state-run propaganda apparatus and affiliated groups in foreign countries make extensive use of social 
media platforms to share and distribute the regime’s propaganda to a wider audience. This propaganda 
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serves an important function in a highly ideological system such as North Korea. It also provides outside 
analysts information about an otherwise closed country. Factories closed to foreigners are routinely 
exposed in footage of North Korean leaders conducting inspections. 
Kim Jong Il’s Efforts to Defend the Country contains the only footage of the inside of North Korea’s 
facility for completing assembly of transporter-erector-launchers for ballistic missiles. The footage 
includes a few seconds of footage showing three clips of Nodong transporter-erector-launchers inside a 
spacious, rectangular, high-bay building, as well as a few more seconds of footage of a very similar 
building containing KN-08 transporter-erector-launchers. Kim Jong Il is shown in some frames, looking at 
one of the Nodong transporter-erector-launchers. The first public description of the film, along with still 
images, appeared on the website, North Korea Leadership Watch, which regularly analyzes North Korean 
propaganda.89 
Figure 3 Stills from Kim Jong Il's Efforts to Defend the Country 
 
 
Modeling the Building from the Inside Out 
The internal images show a building that is quite distinct. It is, in fact, possible to model the outside of 
the building based on its unusual pattern of windows as well as the cupola-like structure near the center 
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of the building. The windows run along only one of the long sides of the building, suggesting it is either 
partially buried or has an adjoining structure on the opposite side. The windows along the long side and 
at the ends of the building are also spaced in an irregular manner, making an identifiable pattern. 
Modeling software is not new, but it is for the first time widely available, free, and easy to use. One of 
the most popular is Trimble SketchUp (previously of Google), which allows a user to create a three-
dimensional digital model of a location, and geo-locate it in Google Earth. When Google sold the 
software to Trimble, its marketers primarily focused on the architects. Fans, however, continue to model 
the world’s most famous structures, and Google still shares them on Google Earth.  
Using SketchUp, we created a model of the inside of the building based on the video footage. Modeling 
the building reveals a number of interesting details, including its approximate dimensions – as well as 
the fact that the two clips seem to be in different buildings, based on the windows and the roof.  
Figure 4 Comparison of Stills with the Virtual Model 
 
Using this process, we created external models of the two buildings – one with a square cupola, and 
another with a larger cupola that spans the length of the roof. 









Defining the Search Area 
Where might such unusual 
buildings be located? Google 
Earth houses an enormous 
repository of sub-meter 
resolution satellite and aerial 
images, including fairly 
comprehensive coverage of 
built-up areas of North 
Korea.90 Additional images 
can be purchased from other 
providers, such as Astrium.91 
The only problem is where 
to start looking. 
A number of defector 
accounts describe the 
location of various North 
Korean defense industries, 
including locations linked to 
the production of vehicle 
chassis and the final 
assembly of transporter-
erector-launchers. A Korean-
speaking student, Amber 
Lee, mined social media sites 
and other electronic 
resources containing 
defector accounts to create 
a search area. Although the accounts differ from one another, many descriptions of North Korea’s 
facilities to assemble missile launchers converge on an area in Chagang (Jaggang) Province that is well 
known as the heart of North Korea’s defense industries. (Chagang is also a center of forestry, an 
amusing coincidence given the stated end-use for the Chinese vehicles.) 
For example, a North Korean defector, Ko Chong Song, published a book in Japan describing the 
locations of North Korean defense enterprises, stating that North Korea produces “missile launchers” at 
the No. 81 Factory located in the “Chungsonggan workers’ district, Songgan County, Chagang Province, 
about 2.5 to 3 kilometers from Songgan-up.”92 Ko offers a caution, however, stating that it is possible 
the No. 81 Factory only produces some component for launchers, with final assembly done elsewhere. 
Figure 6 Square Indicates the Initial Search Area  
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Another account, posted online by an anti-DPRK dissident group, describes a gruesome incident at the 
“No.11 munitions factory (Hakmu worker’s district six kilometers northwest of Jonchon, Jagang) where 
missile launchers are manufactured…” Jonchon and Songgan are close to one another, lying about 10 
kilometers apart along a river valley. 
Songgan, Chunsonggan and Jonchon (Chonchon) all appear in the Gazetteer maintained by the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.93 Hakmu is not – although the description of the place being about 6 km 
NW of Jonchon is consistent with a mention of the same place in a survey conducted by UNICEF and the 
World Health Organization.94 Ko, too, mentions Factory 11 – although he claims it is near Songgan. 
These areas are within a few kilometers of each other, creating a manageable search area centered on 
the river valley between Songgan and Jonchon, particularly the Chungsonggan and Hakmu Worker’s 
Districts, which lie between the two locations.  
There are other locations of possible interest mentioned in these and other defector accounts, but 
mapping the defector accounts reveals that what appear to be two different locations -- Chungsonggan 
and Hakmu Worker’s Districts -- are close enough to be related. This is became our initial search area. 
The ten kilometers along the river valley between Jonchon and Songgan represent a manageable search 
area, but the problem can further simplified through crowdsourcing. The social media site Wikimapia 
and the North Korea Uncovered KMZ file offered by the blog North Korean Economy Watch provide 
locations of many of North Korea’s known defense sites, including surface-to-air missile sites, 
underground facilities, and other locations. Although the No. 81 and No. 11 Factories are not included, 
clusters of surface-to-air missiles sites often help identify locations that the North Koreans regard as 
important installations.95 
The area six kilometers to the northwest of Jonchon – consistent with the location of the Hakmu 
Worker’s District – appears to be well-defended. We started there.  
Figure 7 Search Area Showing Surface-to-Air Missile Sites 
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North Korea’s Final Assembly Facility for Transporter-erector-launchers 
Less than one kilometer from a surface-to-air missile site, and 4.6 kilometers northwest of the Jonchon 
train station (a proxy for central Jonchon), lies a building that matches one of our models. The building is 
located at 40°38'44"N, 126°25'58"E. We will call this Site A. 
Figure 8 Site A 
 
Immediately, several interesting details emerge.  
The building at Site A is a close match based on the modeled dimensions and the windows. The single 
row of high, clerestory windows on the south side of the building results from the presence of a lower 
part of the structure adjoining the hall. The completely windowless opposite side appears to be flush 
with a shed-like structure. The windows at the eastern short end match very closely. The large cupola is 
revealed to be a curved, fan-like structure. 
Historical satellite images suggest that the two roofs are, surprisingly, from the same building. North 
Korea remodeled it between 2004 and 2011 – probably shortly after negotiating for the export of the 





Figure 9 Historical Comparison of Site A in 2004 and 2011 
 
Our modeling, based on the length of the shadows in each image, shows that the North Koreans 
probably added the roof structure to accommodate an erected KN-08 launcher.96 This detail provides 
additional confirmation of the site’s purpose, as well as indicating that China probably only exported the 
bare chassis. The launcher was added here, near Jonchon. 




Figure 11 Model Depiction of Erected KN-08 
 
Along with the US-Korea Institute of Johns Hopkins University, which maintains the blog 38North, we 
purchased new satellite images of the site from Astrium, including a low-angle satellite view that shows 
the windows running alongside the south of the building. They are not evenly spaced, presenting the 
opportunity to match the inside of the building with the outside. The matching window pattern would 
seem to suggest that, at a minimum, the KN-08 launchers were located in the building at Site A. 




The windows in one video clip of the Nodong launcher, however, do not seem to match. In particular, 
one image shows a Nodong with a row of continuous windows behind it. It is possible that the windows 
20 
 
were altered when the roof was remodeled. 
There is another possibility. In addition to the building at Site A, a second, nearly identical building, 
exists a few kilometers away at what we call Site B: 40°36'43"N, 126°25'34"E. This building, too, received 
a new cupola sometime before 2011. 
Figure 13 Historical Comparison of Site B in 2004 and 2011 
 
Based on the defectors’ accounts, it appears that these are North Korea’s most important facilities for 
the final assembly of transporter-erector-launchers.  





As it turns out, a persistent analyst can identify North Korea’s primary facilities for the assembly of 
ballistic missiles transporter-erector-launchers by combing footage posted to YouTube, SketchUp 
simulations of the building, published defector accounts, mapping projects like North Korea Uncovered, 
and commercial satellite images. In isolation, none of these tools would offer much insight into North 
Korea’s illicit nuclear and missile programs. Together, however, it is possible to establish with some 
confidence when and where North Korea fixed the erectors and launchers to imported Chinese heavy-
duty vehicle chassis.  
In a limited sense, many of these steps were possible thirty years ago -- for example, one might have 
been able to procure a North Korean propaganda film, perhaps learning about it at conference (an 
analogue of crowdsourcing). One might have been able to draw the building, hoping it would show up in 
another film. One might also have been able to interview defectors, or even have a colleague mail 
transcripts of an interview. If one were lucky enough to work in the intelligence community, an 
overhead image might be available. Each step, however, would have been labor-intensive – perhaps 
prohibitively so. 
Today, nearly all of this information is available working from one’s office or a coffee shop with decent 
Internet connection – films on YouTube, software to model buildings, and Internet websites of defector 
accounts. Questions can be asked, and answered, by email or social media. Images and models can be 
shared online. Our own team operated virtually, using email and DropBox to connect participants from 
offices in Monterey, California; Washington, DC; and Vienna, Austria. When we purchased satellite 
images, we simply downloaded them. Each of these new media tools exists because of the dramatic 
decline in the cost of sharing information, in both resources and time. Those declining costs open up 
new vistas for research in the field of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament. 
Some Considerations for New Media in Nonproliferation 
The case study has demonstrated the capability of any researcher to use new media technologies to 
discover new information related to nonproliferation and arms control.  Aside from the task-specific 
lessons learned, there are a number of general considerations regarding new media that policy makers 
should keep in mind as they prepare to take advantage of the opportunities provided by these 
technologies.  These guidelines provide a broad outline of tasks and considerations that will facilitate 
the integration of new media tools and techniques into existing nonproliferation and arms control 
efforts. 
Planning 
Planning is the beginning of all successful new media efforts.  Before the effort begins, some person or 
group must assume the role of manager and decide the intent of the project and share that intent with 
the members of the project team.  The project intent should explicitly state the goal or outcome it hopes 
to achieve and also the intended audience (in an outreach effort) or customer (for information gathering 
or analysis).  Once these have been defined, the manager will have taken the first step towards 
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determining what resources need to be applied to the project as well as what success metrics to apply 
and any feedback mechanisms that should be incorporated.    
A new media project plan allows analysts to work more efficiently by limiting the search and processing 
efforts to a defined set of sources and platforms.  Although this sounds risky, as some information will 
be missed or left out, the information and analysis that is obtained will be more likely to meet the stated 
project goal.  Human subject matter expertise is always required to refine and interpret results, but the 
effort taken up front to steer the research effort is often the chief discriminator between successful and 
unsuccessful projects.98 An early determination of the sources and software tools or platforms required 
will also help to decide on what resources will need to be devoted to the project. 
A final planning factor that is of special consideration for government users of new media is 
administrative and legal issues.  There is still much debate over the Constitutionality of using online 
information for analysis,99 and even in cases where Constitutionality is no concern, statutory issues such 
as copyright, privacy act information, or Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
privacy restrictions may still apply.   
Use all Functions of New Media 
As shown in the typology (figure 1), new media functions are not exclusive.  Often, as demonstrated in 
the case study, the optimal solution to a nonproliferation challenge will be found by combining different 
elements from the various functions.  For example, in order to identify the suspected TEL assembly sites, 
the team used information provided by various blog entries.  Blogs fall under the Content Creation 
function, but the Social function was used to help analyze blog content and translate some of the 
Chinese and Korean language entries.   Simultaneously, the Problem Solving function was used to 
identify suspected sites based on surface to air missile clusters.  In the end, some element of all five 
functions was required to find the solution to the location of the assembly site.   
Know the Capabilities and Limitations 
Users and managers must understand the capabilities and limitations of new media.  These may be 
technical, such as the available resolution of commercial satellite imagery, or conceptual, such as the 
importance of “weak ties” for information sharing in networks.  Regardless, everyone involved in 
applying new media should have a basic understanding of what it can and cannot do and why.  Such an 
understanding not only speeds up planning and decision making, but allows ensures human judgment 
remains at the center of the process. 
Management is Still Required 
Successful new media initiatives require a substantial management effort.  The distributed nature of 
much of the technology often means traditional management structures cannot coordinate actions or 
make decisions in time to respond to changing information.  On top of this, some of the outputs from 
new media require refinement and interpretation before they are usable.  Finally, the work may require 
allocating scarce manpower or computer resources, or the development of an appropriate incentive 
scheme to encourage outside users to participate. 
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All of this is to say that the management requirements of a new media effort are likely to be equal to or 
greater than those using more traditional methods.  Managers should plan accordingly.   
Conclusion and Next Steps 
When Seymour Melman and Lewis Bohn first proposed “inspection by the people” in the mid-20th 
century, the idea of an unsupervised electronic network providing instant communication between any 
two people on the planet would have sounded like fantasy.  Today, despite the existence of just such a 
network, societal verification in the sense of whistleblowing still faces many of the same obstacles it 
faced in Melman and Bohn’s time.  Citizens are reluctant to report violations related to security issues, 
either out of support for their state or fear of the repercussions.   Even when someone does want to 
report, the average person does not have the expertise required to document or properly verify a 
violation.  And, if a report were received, there is no mechanism to incorporate this type of notification 
into existing treaty procedures.   
The strength of a new media approach to nonproliferation is it does not rely on a whistleblowing model.  
Instead, new media presents an opportunity for subject matter experts and interested amateurs to 
harness existing information and quickly and efficiently pool resources for interpretation and analysis.  
The case study presented here offers a glimpse of the scope of information that a coordinated new 
media effort can produce in a very short time and with limited resources.  Starting from a video shared 
over social media, the research team was not only able to identify previously undisclosed missile 
facilities, but offer a compelling hypothesis for the types of activities undertaken there.  Furthermore, 
the team was able to provide evidence confirming the Chinese story that the truck chassis in question 
were most likely modified after they had been shipped to North Korea.  
The capabilities of new media demonstrated here are focused on a typical information discovery 
problem and are only a small sample of possibilities.  This paper sampled a considerable body of 
theoretical and empirical research to show that information travels rapidly across a network, individual 
nodes (information sources) in any network can be discovered by any other member of the network, 
and properties such as “virality” and “influence,” while not fully understood, are increasingly able to be 
measured and described.  Moreover, scientists and industry have greatly refined the art of 
crowdsourced collaboration, and learned how to apply those techniques towards solving some of the 
most world’s most difficult problems.100  Large scale nonproliferation information campaigns, virtual site 
inspections for training or testing inspection protocols,101 and expert “swarming” for problem solving are 
some ideas that could be easily developed further based on the principles discussed in this paper.   
Business, academia, and society at large have all witnessed enormous changes brought on by new media 
technologies.  We believe there is clear opportunity for these technologies to benefit the arms control 
and nonproliferation communities as well.  As is clear from the case study, the technical barriers to entry 
are low and the information payoff can be very high.  Understanding the technology is only part of the 
challenge, however.  To realize its full potential, decision makers must also be willing to devote the 
necessary resources—people, time, and equipment.  When both aspects are combined, new media 
technologies and methods offer an efficient, effective, and low cost means of addressing 
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nonproliferation information discovery challenges.  We hope the success shown here points the way 
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